Nowhere is the credibility of the United States and its partners more at stake than in the Baltic Sea region. NATO's Article 5 commits the alliance to protect its members. It is difficult to do so for the Baltic provinces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three small but densely populated republics wedged between Russia, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea. Long periods of cost-cutting, hesitancy, and living in dream world by NATO states make it more difficult.
As Russia's
military buildup surrounding Ukraine increases worries of a wider East-West
security crisis, NATO allies are hurrying to reinforce the Baltic nations'
guards, while non-NATO members Sweden and Finland are repairing their ties with
the union. F-15 fighters from the United States Air Force arrived in Estonia in
late January as part of a massive consolation effort. At other locations in
Europe and the United States, 8,500 US military personnel are on high alert,
ready to deploy to the region as part of NATO's serious zones of strength for
40,000 Force.
These
initiatives, although appealing, are both late and insufficient. Local security
in the Baltic Sea has been a problem, as has the stalemate with Russia. Taking
on these demands is more than an eccentric, responsive sending. I spent the
prior year in the weeds with Ben Hodges, a former US Armed Forces official in Europe,
and now my colleague at the Center for European Policy Analysis, looking at
issues of Baltic Sea province security and how to address them.
Everything
appears to be in order. NATO allies have deployed reported improved advance
presence tripwire forces totaling 1,000 soldiers in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. These forces are incapable of withstanding a Russian attack; they
are present to assure the Kremlin understands that an attack on the Baltic
nations would also be an attack on other NATO members. The United States has a
larger presence in neighboring Poland, with 5,000 aid workers. The Baltic
nations and Poland also have an impact:
Their defense
budgets exceed the NATO-mandated minimum of 2% of GDP. These resources are
spent wisely, with an eye on modern armament that may slow, and hence help
halt, a Russian assault. Since roughly 1991, NATO has been an organization
dedicated to peace rather than conflict, a dangerously outdated idea.
Across the
Baltic Sea, Sweden and Finland have also reduced their expenditure. These two
non-NATO countries have close military ties with one another and with NATO.
Adjoining Norway, albeit not a coastal state, is well-versed in Baltic Sea
security because of its calculating, knowledgeable, and military aviation
capabilities. Denmark has reversed its previous protection posture, which
minimized any demand for regional and territorial protection. Consolidated,
Poland, together with the Nordic countries and three Baltic states, have a
higher GDP than Russia. Their total defense budget is around half that of
Russia, but the Kremlin has global ambitions such as space weapons, a
blue-water naval force, and a significant nuclear arsenal.
Germany is
the black spot in the district's security. Its size and area would add
essential heave, however other Baltic Sea states are discreetly distrustful of
Berlin's leaders. Germany has backed the two Nord Stream petroleum gas
pipelines that run beneath the Baltic Sea. Different nations in the region
regard them as a major threat, undermining the Kremlin's command over the
district's energy supply. (As a counter-move, Poland has recently constructed a
pipeline to Norway to obtain another source of gas.)
Could
Germany, in the event of Russian incitement, support discouragement or call for
dialogue and split the difference? Germany's waffling on Ukraine, which
includes preventing Estonia from providing a few desperately needed howitzers
to the beleaguered Ukrainians, makes me suspicious. Latvian Defense Minister
Artis Pabriks described Germany's strategy as "corrupt and cunning"
last week.
Many people
believe that NATO's involvement in the area has already gone too far. Russian
President Vladimir Putin has urged that NATO withdraw all external powers from
the region and concentrate on Sweden and Finland never being allowed to join.
However,
behind the surface, the region's protection and security measures, far from
hurting Russia, appear concerningly fragile. In our Center for European Policy
Analysis research, we identified more than a dozen problematic topics. It all
starts with the West's attitude toward Russia. Local government personnel and leaders
have fundamentally different risk assessments. Since the 1990s, the Baltic
states have been sounding the alarm. Different countries are much later to the
party and much more cautious in what they say, and this is before you get to
the huge problem of Germany.
All of the
other things are hampered by these differing hazard assessments and political
approaches. The bay between NATO and non-NATO citizens impedes knowledge
collection and transfer. Washington eagerly monitors its greatest sources of
information, such as Russian submarines. Even inside NATO, there are internal
and outward rings. For example, there is the British-American knowledge-sharing
agreement, which also includes the other alleged Five Eyes: Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand.
Military mobility,
the critical business of moving large numbers of people and equipment, is also
uneven. There is no standard marine technique; but in an emergency, control of
the Baltic Sea will determine what happens ashore. Ground-based defense
frameworks against air and rocket attacks are costly. No country in the region
has enough of these safeguards, and several have none. NATO's small air
policing organization - usually only four jets based in Estonia or Lithuania is
intended to deal with peacetime concerns such as airspace disruptions, not to
fight the Russian Air Force. Despite assuming liberal assumptions, a Polish
operation last year ended with Polish troops being slaughtered in five days and
the Russians poised to conquer Warsaw.
The order
structure is reminiscent of a dish of spaghetti. Every country closely monitors
its public decision-making process. Although the Baltic republics constitute a
single functioning zone in military terms, they maintain three public base
camps, each with limited authority. NATO has two divisional and one corps
central commands, with Estonian and Latvian authorities reporting to a Danish
base camp located midway between Denmark and Latvia. The other two base camps
are in Poland. Further up the food chain, NATO's major land power central
command is based in the Netherlands, although it shares responsibilities with
its maritime counterpart in Naples, Italy, on a six-month rotating basis.
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